This paper takes advantage of the dynamic nature of institutional reforms in transition economies and explores the causal effects of those reforms on bank risk. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we show that banks' financial stability increases substantially after these countries reform their legal institutions, liberalize banking, and restructure corporate governance. We also find that the effects of legal and governance reforms on bank risk may critically depend on the progress of banking reforms. A further examination of alternative risk measures reveals that the increases in financial stability among banks mainly come from the reduction of asset risk. Banks tend to have lower ROA volatility and fewer nonperforming loans after reforming the institutional environment. Finally, we split our sample into foreign and domestic banks and find that the enhancement of financial stability is more pronounced for domestic banks.
Introduction
A large body of literature pioneered by La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 suggests that efficient legal systems and strong investor protections facilitate financial market development through better contracting and enforcement mechanisms. Accordingly, the literature also suggests that the presence of these institutions is associated with more private credit availability, lower bank financing cost for firms, and more favorable financial contracts (Djankov et al., 2007; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; .
More recently, a number of studies apply these important insights to the examination of risk taking behavior of firms. For example, John et al. (2008) find that stronger shareholder protections reduce managerial entrenchment and incentivize managers to undertake riskier but possibly more value-enhancing investments. Stronger creditor protections, on the other hand, tend to discourage that behavior and lead to more value-decreasing diversifications (Acharya et al., 2011) . Focusing on banking institutions, Laeven and Levine (2009) demonstrate that banks with powerful shareholders take more risks, and how national regulations affect that bank risk may also depend on the ownership structure of banks. Houston et al. (2010) extend the analysis to creditor rights and information sharing. Their findings suggest that strengthened creditor protections are associated with greater bank risk and that better information sharing reduces bank risk.
This literature, however, has not been successful in establishing a causal relation between institutional developments and banking stability. Reverse causality can be a potential concern where regulations and investor protections can endogenously change in response to the changes in banking stability. Moreover, the differences in institutional developments across countries are likely to be correlated with other country characteristics that may influence both institutional development and banking stability simultaneously. If this is the case, the observed relation between institutional development and bank risk might be spurious because it could be shaped by omitted country variables. In order to establish a causal link, one would ideally need to obtain exogenous changes of institutional environment and test what impacts they have on bank risk taking. However, it is noted that the quality of institutional 0378-4266/$ -see front matter Crown Copyright Ó 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.11.003 development in many countries has hardly changed over time, hence posing a large challenge in exploring the causal relations in the law and finance literature (Glaeser et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2007; .
In this paper, we take advantage of Eastern European countries as a natural experiment to explore the causal effects of institutional developments on banking stability. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, former member countries underwent a series of banking reforms, legal reforms, and corporate governance restructure. These institutional reforms have created exogenous variations in the timing and depth of the institutional development, which provides an ideal setting to overcome the endogenous nature of institutional development . We therefore can test in a clean and direct manner how substantial changes in institutional environments are transmitted to the banking sector and affect individual banks' risk-taking behavior. Our main research question is to investigate how institutional reforms affect bank risk with regards to banking liberalization, creditor rights, and corporate governance restructuring. We also investigate whether different reforms substitute for or complement one other in influencing bank risk. Furthermore, given that the presence of foreign banks is a key characteristic of the banking markets in transition countries, we examine whether institutional reforms affect foreign banks and domestic banks differently.
To analyze the impacts of institutional reforms on banking stability, we exploit the reform indicators in EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) data set, and employ a differences-in-differences (DID hereafter) approach to examine how bank risk changes subsequent to the changes of reform progress. Specifically, we obtain yearly progress in creditor rights reforms, banking liberalization, and corporate governance restructuring of 15 transition countries from 1997 to 2008. For each year, countries that experienced reforms belong to the treatment group, and countries with no changes belong to the control group. Given that the reforms in transition countries took place at different time periods in different countries, we apply the DID approach in a multiple groups and multiple time periods framework (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Hansen, 2007; . This empirical strategy allows us to address many threats concerning validity. For example, comparing bank risk level between the treatment and control groups in the post-reform periods removes biases due to common economic trend of the two groups. Moreover, it also allows the comparison between the pre-reform and post-reform periods within the treatment group, which removes biases that could be due to other omitted time invariant factors, rather than reform events (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) .
Following recent literature on bank risk, we use Z-score as our primary measure for bank stability. The inverse Z-score can be used to approximate a bank's probability of default (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston et al., 2010; Delis et al., 2012; Goetz, 2012; Jiménez et al., 2013) . Our main findings suggest that better institutional developments lead to higher banking stability. In particular, a bank's financial stability rises by about 0.53 if creditor rights improve by one standard deviation. It rises by about 0.54 and 0.32 if the level of governance reforms and banking liberalization improve by one standard deviation, respectively. These effects are both statistically significant (p < 5%) and economically meaningful, as the average value of bank stability in our sample is 3.26. We also find that banking reforms complement legal reforms. In particular, the effects of creditor rights and corporate governance reforms on bank risk depend critically on the progress of banking reforms such that it is only after a relatively well-developed banking sector is established that legal reforms and corporate governance reforms become more impactful in enhancing banking stability. However, how banking reforms affect bank risk does not rely on the level of creditor rights or corporate governance reforms.
We also examine alternative risk measures to explore the sources of risk reduction. For example, we find asset risk (proxied by ROA volatility) reduces significantly after all three types of reforms occur. Credit risk (proxied by non-performing loans) also decreases after banking reforms and corporate governance restructuring. The examination on equity-to-asset ratio suggests that the capitalization level is reduced after banking liberalization. This potentially strengthens our results, as it implies that the reduction of asset risk and credit risk is strong enough to overcome the decrease of capitalization. To examine market risk, we use ROE volatility as the major proxy and the main findings remain upheld. 1 Finally, we develop a new measure of ''relative stability'' utilizing the stochastic-frontier technique (a detailed methodology is provided in Appendix B). It captures the relative performance of how close a bank's financial stability is to the best performing bank given its production inputs and outputs condition. Our results are robust using relative stability measures.
While it is suggested that the dynamic nature of institutional reforms in transition economies represents an ideal setting to overcome major identification problems (Giannetti and Ongena, 2009; , 2 a potential endogeneity issue with our study is that institutional reforms might be coincident with the change in economic climate or bank-specific financial conditions. Specifically, it is not the reforms that make banks more stable, but instead certain time varying variables either at the country or bank levels, as the DID approach controls omitted variables problems that are time-invariant but not heterogeneous trends across countries or banks. We take a number of steps to alleviate the omitted variables problem as illustrated above. First, we control various time-varying bank characteristics that might affect bank risk taking. We also include various macro-variables to control for economic conditions of our sample countries. Second, we employ DID approach in a panel regression framework, in which we control both country-and yearfixed effects across all regressions. As a robustness check, we also perform firm-fixed effect estimations to account for unobserved time-invariant bank characteristics that may influence risk taking. This allows us to account for bank specific omitted variables that affect banks' decision to take risk, such as differences in managerial incentives of risk taking and shareholders' specific utility function with regards to risk taking. Third, we examine the correlations relating past economic and banking market conditions (e.g., economic growth and domestic credit to GDP) to the progress of institutional reforms of the current year. Results indicate that the progress of institutional reforms is not associated with these economic factors, which alleviates the concern of spurious correlation coefficients (results will be provided upon request). Overall, endogeneity does not appear to explain the documented relationship between institutional reforms and bank risk taking. Regarding the role of foreign banks, we first determine if our conclusions on institutional reforms and bank risk still hold after taking into account the large presence of foreign banks. As indicated by prior literature, foreign banks are more efficient lenders in emerging markets (e.g., Levine, 1996; Claessens et al., 2001; Ongena, 2009, 2012) . The disadvantage of foreign banks, however, is the lack of information about local culture and institutions (Buch, 2003; Mian, 2006) . Hence, when the banking market is liberalized and legal institutions become stronger, more foreign banks enter with superior risk management skills that enhance the stability of the local banking market. This could confound our results on the relationship between institutional reforms and bank risk. To correct for the simultaneous effects of institutional development on foreign bank presence, as well as on bank risk, we run a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) on both bank risk and number of foreign banks. In addition, to control for the risk-return correlation, we also run the SUR on bank profitability. Our results confirm the findings on creditor rights reforms and banking liberalization. The impact of governance reforms on bank stability becomes less significant.
Second, we split the sample into domestic and foreign banks to investigate whether their risk taking behavior responds to different institutional reforms in different ways. We find that domestic banks significantly improve their stability level subsequent to all three types of reforms. Foreign take-over banks (banks that are acquired by foreign owners) only improve their financial stability after creditor rights reforms, but are not affected by governance reforms and banking reforms. Greenfield banks (wholly owned by foreign banks) do not seem to react to any reforms in a material way. There are several explanations. One possible reason is that domestic banks are less efficient to start with, and hence there is a higher scope for improvement once institutional environment becomes stronger. As for foreign banks, some of the literature suggests that they have easier access to financing from either the internal capital market of the parent firm or from the capital market of their home countries, and hence their performance is less sensitive to the economic conditions of the host countries (De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006; Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2011) . Another reason could be that foreign banks tend to lower lending standards when going abroad to countries with less restrictive banking regulations (Ongena et al., 2013) . Hence, while both domestic banks and foreign banks could benefit from improved institutional development, our results indicate that foreign banks may have greater incentives to make risky loans than domestic banks. This paper adds to the literature in the following ways. The work of Houston et al. (2010) is the first to examine how institutional development in creditor rights and information sharing affect bank risk taking using data mostly from market economies. Our paper focuses on transition countries to provide a dynamic perspective on how changes of institutional environment affect bank risk taking. By exploiting transition economies as a natural experiment, we provide direct evidence on the causal effects of creditor rights, country corporate governance, and banking liberalization on bank risk, which prior studies have not been able to show. Our research design follows , who analyze the impacts of creditor rights reforms on bank lending in transition economies. Nevertheless, we move beyond their paper by examining bank risk and by focusing on a wider range of reforms. Moreover, we show that banking reforms can be complementary to legal reforms in the sense that when banking reforms progress well, legal reforms could become more impactful in reducing bank risk.
Second, our findings on domestic versus foreign banks also have related implications for the international banking literature. Recent studies in this literature have mainly focused on how bank regulations of host countries affect multinational banks' lending activities. For example, Houston et al. (2012) finds that cross-border bank flows increase when the target country has less restrictive banking regulations but stronger creditor protections. Ongena et al. (2013) show that foreign banks tend to lower their lending standard when entering a country with less restrictive banking regulations as compared with home country regulations. We complement their work by looking at whether and how foreign banks' risk taking respond to the changes of creditor rights reforms, corporate governance reforms, and banking liberalization.
Third, this paper is also closely related to some of the literature on banking institutions in transition economies (e.g., Weill, 2003; Hasan and Marton, 2003; Bonin et al., 2005a Bonin et al., , 2005b Wachtel, 2007, 2010; Agoraki et al., 2011; Berger et al., 2009; Fang et al., 2011) . In concurring with these papers, we argue that instead of pooling together a large number of other countries that are in completely different stages of institutional development, researchers should pay special attention to transition economies as a separate group. Since transition countries began reforming institutional systems 20 years ago (compared with some mature market economies, where institutional reforms began hundreds years ago), it is possible that the effects of institutional development on bank risk in transition countries differ from market economies. For example, we find that the improvements in creditor rights reforms lead to a decrease in bank risk. This is opposite to the finding of Houston et al. (2010) , who focus on market economies and find that a better creditor rights environment increases risk taking by banks. Our explanation for this result is that banks in transition economies (particularly domestic banks) used to suffer from a big burden of non-performing loans. When legal environments improve, rather than taking more risk, they would first want to secure their existing loans and stabilize income by forcing repayment and having better control of insolvent debtors. However, in more advanced economies, as Houston et al. (2010) suggested, better legal protections for creditors offer more confidence to banks to take on risky projects. Together, these findings highlight our point that institutional development can have different impacts on banking stability depending on the status of economies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review relevant literature and introduce the background of various institutional reforms in transition countries. Section 3 describes the sample selection and methodology. Section 4 presents the analysis of the empirical results, and Section 5 discusses policy implications and concludes.
Institutional reforms in transition economies

Banking Reforms and effects on bank risk
Prior to the reforms, the banking sectors were operated in a centrally planned economy. Commercial banks usually specialized in serving one industry, and their lending activities were exclusively to governments and public enterprises. The central banks entirely controlled the lending budget based on the government plans. Bankers therefore faced no competition pressure and had little incentive to monitor the performance of borrowers. Regulators did not have requisite expertise or sufficient independence to cope with this problem. In the absence of independent market-oriented banking institutions, bad loans continued to accumulate. To some extent, the bad loan was the biggest problem of state-owned banks in transition countries (Perotti, 1993; Kager, 2002) .
After the collapse of Soviet Union, governments in transition countries started substantial reforms in the banking sectors to facilitate the transformation from socialist to market-oriented economies. The development of efficient banking sectors required the completion of three interrelated tasks, namely, the resolution of non-performing loans, the privatization of state-owned banks, and the establishment of effective regulatory frameworks. First, to solve the bank loan problem, governments focused on revising bankruptcy laws and introducing new banking laws. For example, in the early 1990s, the Hungarian government enacted strong bankruptcy laws and accounting rules to clean up the portfolios of its banks. In 1992, the government replaced non-performing loans on bank balance sheet with government securities and transferred these assets to a government collection agency, which pursued an aggressive strategy of selling controlling stakes of the large stateowned commercial banks to foreign investors. Second, the privatization process experienced several stages. After witnessing bank failure and systemic crises in the mid-1990s, transition countries started reforming banking sectors and opened up the markets to foreign banks. Different countries had different approaches.
3 But with the large involvement of foreign banks, most state-owned banks in transition economies have been replaced by privately owned, market-oriented, and well capitalized banking institutions. And foreign banks dominated the sector in many transition countries by the end of the century. Finally, bank regulation in transition economies also went through multiple stages. Early reforms aim at opening up the market, fostering market competition, and creating a diverse range of banking institutions. 4 The supervision framework at that time, however, did not follow the rapid adoption of financial liberalization policies. As a result, in many countries, new banks were created without adequate capital and regulatory oversight.
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To address this issue, governments put efforts on building prudential supervision guidelines with focus on regulation of capital adequacy, supervisory power and independence, loan classification stringency, diversification guidelines, and regulations fostering information disclosure and private sector monitoring of banks.
In the literature, the effects of bank regulation on risk taking are ambiguous. Under the traditional view, financial liberalization is generally associated with increased market competition, which could induce greater bank risk-taking and intensified moral-hazard issues (Keeley, 1990; Grossman, 1992; Galloway et al., 1997; Boyd et al., 1998) . Consistent with this view, Dick (2006) finds higher loan-loss provisions following the Riegle-Neal Act deregulation in the 1990s in the United States. Esty (1998) documents that more restrictive requirements on bank liability structure discourage risk taking behaviour. An alternative view, however, says that if banks are liberalized and given greater freedom, they are more able to pursue economies of scale and scope, diversify income flows, and consequently become less risky (Claessens and Klingebiel, 2000) . Also, restrictive regulations might also reduce banks' charter values and incentivize bankers to take on risky projects (Hellmann et al., 2000; Gonzalez, 2005) . Some recent surveys and empirical studies tend to lend support to this argument. For example, Barth et al. (2001a Barth et al. ( , 2004 and Laeven and Levine (2009) find that countries with less regulatory restrictions on bank activities have more stable financial systems.
Noticeably, most prior studies on bank regulation and risk-taking primarily focus on market-oriented countries, and many transition economies are left out of the sample. 6 The situation of banking environment in transition economies, however, is more dynamic. In particular, early banking reforms in transition countries have mainly consisted of financial liberalization policies, such as privatization of ownership, the removal of administrative controls on interest rates, the scaling down of directed credit programs, and the removal of entry barriers. As modern banking systems have emerged and developed, recent reforms are more focused on building prudential regulation guidelines in order to provide effective supervisory framework for the banking institutions. Economic theories provide conflicting predictions regarding the impacts of bank regulation policies on bank performance, and there is still no consensus on what type of regulatory practices are effective in reducing bank risk (e.g. Barth et al., 2004 Barth et al., , 2007a . Take some examples of transition economies to illustrate, the government bailout of bad loans on one hand reduces banks' credit risk; on the other hand may create abundant liquidity that increases the incentives for over lending and higher risk (Allen and Gale, 2009 ). The removal of state control and liberalizing interest rates greatly help increase market competition, which on one hand reduces market imperfection and enhances bank efficiency in allocating resources. But on the other hand, market competition may also intensify and lead to bankers' moral hazard problem and lead to excessive risk taking. Regarding financial liberalization, e.g. allowing banks to engage in non-lending services or participating in real estate transactions, although it is often argued that such diversification help banks achieve risk diversification, it is also plausible that the lack of expertise in the new business may also lead to more volatile incomes and higher risk (Acharya et al., 2006) . Under a stronger regulatory framework, banks could improve financial transparency and corporate governance, which is good for reducing risk taking behavior of managers, but stringent capital requirement is not necessarily associated with less loan losses (Kopecky and VanHoose, 2006; Pasiouras et al., 2006) . Too much supervisory power may also lead to corruptions in lending, which is not desirable for overall banking stability (Beck et al., 2006; Levine, 2003) . As a result, while the banking reforms in transition economies intend to remove the imperfections in the financial markets and to support the well-functioning of the market-oriented market, policies that liberalize the market and that improve regulation and supervision may have distinctive implications on behaviour of banks. The effect of a series of combined policies on bank risk is an empirical issue, which critically depends on whether the benefits of these policies outweigh the costs.
Corporate reforms and effects on bank risk
Before economic reforms took place in transition countries, most firms were government-owned and there were no shareholders. Governance mechanisms and property protection for private investors were largely absent. Financial institutions only followed government plan to allocate funding to the firms and played no active role of financial discipline. It is widely documented that the state ownership, poor financial accountability, weak corporate control, and absence of modern corporate governance are main problems for the poor performance of the corporate sectors in the former socialist countries (Kornai, 1992; Stiglitz, 1999) .
In the early and intermediate stages of transition, the main priority of corporate reforms is to improve the quality of general management. The adoption of modern corporate governance mechanism has become an important issue in transition countries in the recent years. Several organizations such as OECD, the World Bank, and the U.S. Commerce and State Department strongly emphasize that the improvement of the standards of governance would bring the countries closer to join EU (e.g., Richter, 2009) . To express the commitment of joining EU, governments in the transition economies all implemented substantial reforms to restructure the enterprise sectors. Major reforms include privatizing ownership structure, building a rule-based system of corporate governance, establishing property rights systems, protecting minority shareholders' rights, enforcing bankruptcy legislation, and strengthening financial discipline. The ultimate goal of these 3 For example, Poland privatized its banks using a combination of domestic initial public offerings and tenders to sell non-majority stakes to a strategic foreign investor. Later bank privatization programs in other countries, such as Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and the Czech Republic, involved negotiated deals between the government and a single foreign bank (Bonin et al., 2009) . 4 Numerical policies were implemented, such as the removal of administrative controls on interest rates, scaling down of directed credit programs, and allowing commercial banks to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities. 5 For example, banks were used to channel loans improperly to their owners, resulted in considerable asset stripping and insider lending. 6 Brissimis et al. (2008) investigate the effects of banking reforms in transition countries on bank efficiency. They show that banking reforms, through increased competition and greater risk-taking, increase banking efficiency.
reforms is to foster market-oriented competition, improve transparency and disclosure of the firms, and strengthen corporate control via the corporate board and financial institutions. Intuitively, the stability of the banking sector is closely related to the performance of enterprise sector, as corporate loans constitute a large proportion of bank income. In transition countries, this connection is more pronounced given that nonperforming loans are at the root of the commercial banks' trouble (Perotti, 1993; Kager, 2002) . Puffer and McCarthy (2003) discuss the substantial progress made in corporate governance in Russia. They highlight that establishing a good corporate governance structure is a crucial step to solve nondisclosure and nontransparency issues, which had made Russia one of the riskiest countries for investment. Pistor (2000) also demonstrates that the emerging private ownership in transition countries requires legal institutions to remodel laws to build a good corporate governance structure, as it can provide the outsiders better protections to maximize their returns on the investment, e.g., by exercising adequate management oversight, enhancing the transparency of financial disclosure, and minimizing expropriation risk through a satisfactory legal framework. When no substantial progress of corporate reforms occur, shareholders would not want to invest, and firms would suffer from high financing cost and default risk. Banks, as major credit providers, might either hesitate to lend or become unable to retrieve their money and suffer from large income volatility. Therefore, we expect that the progress in corporate governance reforms is positively associated with bank stability.
Legal reforms and effects on bank risk
In the early stage of a transition, legal systems in transition countries are all well below the world average (Pistor, 2000) . In the absence of sanctioned financial discipline and creditor rights, banks do not want to lend money to firms . In order to create an investor-friendly, transparent, and predictable legal environment, governments in transition economies modify bankruptcy and collateral laws and also improve the efficiency of judicial systems. Commercial and financial laws are remodelled based on Western model laws (Dahan, 2000) . The desire to attract foreign investment drives the reforms during the early stage of transition. In the later years, the main objective is to catch up with international standards and to create a functional legal regime.
The legal and financial literature has long recognized the importance of legal systems in promoting the overall level of financing (La Porta et al., 1997 , 1998 Djankov et al., 2007; . The suggested mechanism through which stronger creditor rights enhance lending volume is to empower lenders to secure their loans and enforce their rights in bankruptcy procedures and collateral recovery. According to this rationale, we might expect that, all else equal, banks should be more likely to grab collateral, force repayment, and control insolvent debtors in a stronger legal environment. This in turn leads to higher financial stability. Moreover, banks with more control can apply more restrictions and play a better role in monitoring firms. Clearly, this would also help reduce borrowers' default risk and enhance bank financial stability. However, an alternative hypothesis is that stronger legal protections foster the confidence to lend to risky enterprises with poorer credit ratings. Supporting this point of view, Houston et al. (2010) find that stronger creditor rights are correlated with higher bank risk-taking. Moreover, the likelihood of financial crisis also increases in an environment with better creditor rights.
Interactive roles of three types of reforms
While banking reforms, legal reforms, and corporate governance reforms exert individual impacts on bank risk, they may also have some contingent effects on each other. However, which reform plays a more dominant role is an empirical issue. For example, it is possible that corporate governance restructuring and legal reforms in the enterprise sector play a more fundamental role in affecting the riskiness of banks. This is because a satisfactory institutional environment in place is essential for banks to exercise adequate monitoring on borrowers' management, enhance the transparency of financial disclosure, and minimize the risk in the financial contracts. In this case, depending on the level of governance reform and legal reform, the effects of banking reforms on bank risk may vary. When a good institutional framework is established, banking reform can play a more powerful role in reducing bank risk.
In the countries where economic activities have largely occurred in the presence of under developed financial systems and weaker institutions, banks, as the main financing source for enterprises, face high risk. In particular, when an economy has a centralcontrolled financial market, bank lending follows the government budget and enterprises lack the collateral required for taking out a loan. As a result, even though firms produce at a suboptimal scale, they are still able to obtain financing continuously from the banks. Due to the lack of market competition and effective banking laws that facilitate the transactions, banks do not have sufficient incentives to monitor the lending portfolios. Hence, banking reform is the necessary and first step to improve bank performance. Moreover, because banking reform policies, such as liberalizing interest rate, scaling down of directed credit programs, and allowing commercial banks to engage in non-traditional banking businesses, could influence banking sectors more directly than enterprise corporate governance restructuring and legal reforms, it is also very plausible that banking reforms can be the first-order important contributing factor for banks' risk taking behavior. After the banking system was transformed to a more market-oriented environment and implemented with effective banking laws, legal reforms and corporate governance restructuring in the enterprise sectors can have a more powerful impacts on reducing bank risk.
Data and methodology
Bank variables and country-level macro-controls
Our sample consists of 434 commercial banks in 15 Eastern European countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia) from 1997 to 2008. Bank-level information is from the BankScope of Bureau van Dijk. It is a widely used database in banking studies, but the preliminary data for transition countries require careful editing (Bonin et al., 2005a) . 7 Note that not all banks appear every year.
Approximately there are 130 banks, on average, per year. All accounting variables are inflation-adjusted and reported in thousands of U.S. dollars. The data for bank ownership is also drawn from BankScope. Because banks in transition countries changed ownership several times over the past two decades, it is important to have yearly ownership data so that all the ownership changes in our sample period are identified (De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006) . A limitation of BankScope is, however, that it only provides shareholder information for the years in which the database was last updated (1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007) . Therefore, we fill in the missing 7 We use the unconsolidated financial reports of commercial banks whenever available because the reports provide financial data for the banks themselves rather than their bank holding companies. International Accounting Standards (IAS) data are used wherever available; otherwise, inflation-adjusted data based on local accounting standards are used. years with data from previous years if available. For year 1997 and 1998, we fill in ownership data of 1999. To achieve higher accuracy, we manually search bank websites and business publications as a double check. Through this process we identify shareholder information for 262 banks. We group those shareholders into three categories based on the characteristics of the majority ownership. As a result, there are 90 domestic banks, 191 foreign takeover banks, and 58 greenfield banks.
As for country-level variables, we collect per capita GDP and inflation from the 2010 World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). In addition, we gather information on deposit insurance coverage for individual countries from the database developed by Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2007) . Deposit Insurance is a dummy variable that indicates whether a country has explicit deposit insurance in a given year. We also obtain bank-crisis information for individual countries from a dataset compiled by Laeven and Valencia (2010) . Bank Crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country is going through a systemic crisis in a given year; it equals 0 otherwise.
Measuring institutional reforms
We examine three categories of institutional reforms, namely banking reforms, corporate reforms, and legal reforms. Indicators for the first two reforms are from the transition reports produced by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EBRD research group tracks the transition progress in different sectors of former socialist countries. For each sector, EBRD constructs indicators to proxy the year-end status of various reforms. For example, the indicator for banking reforms considers the degree of liberalization of interest rates, the allocation of bank credit, whether significant lending to private enterprises exists, whether private banks have a significant presence, and whether bank supervision and regulation are prudent (EBRD, 2006) . The indicator goes from 1 to 4.3, with higher numbers indicating higher stages of development. Previous studies that utilize the EBRD banking reform indices include Koutsomanoli-Filippakj et al. (2009 ), Brissimis et al. (2008 , Fries and Taci (2005) and Bonin et al. (2009) .
To evaluate the progress of corporate sector reforms, EBRD provides three indicators: small-scale privatization, large-scale privatization, and restructuring of corporate governance. Small-scale privatization focuses on small companies, while large-scale privatization focuses on large-enterprise privatization process. The indicator of corporate governance restructuring evaluates whether there are sufficient corporate laws to promote the adoption of modern governance. The average value of the three indicators is a proxy for the overall progress of corporate reforms. The higher the value, the more significant the improvement in privatization and the more effective the corporate control over domestic financial institutions and markets, fostering market-driven restructuring. Studies utilize this indictor include Carlin and Aghion (1996) and Zinnes et al. (2001) .
Regarding legal reforms, we borrow the creditor-rights indicator provided by Pistor (2000) , Pistor et al. (2000) and . Their creditor-rights indicator evaluates the progress of legal reforms in two areas: individual enforcement regimes (collateral laws) and collective enforcement regimes (bankruptcy laws). The collateral laws specify the type and scope of security interests a lender may require (e.g., whether mortgaged land or personal assets can be used as collateral). Bankruptcy laws ensure an orderly procedure for conflicting claims so that creditors can control the liquidation process and avoid a wasteful run on the assets of firms. Table 1 provides summary statistics for three institutional reforms in individual countries over the period [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Fig. 1 describes the changes in institutional-reform indictors over the sample period. Our empirical analysis examines how bank risk changes after the reforms.
Measuring bank risk
It is well known that bank risk has many sources. For example, banks are exposed to credit risk and liquidity risk, which are typically due to mismatched maturities and durations between assets and liabilities. Moreover, banks are also subject to operating risks, which usually appear when operating costs are significantly higher than the price of output. There are other risks due to economic turmoil and political changes at the macroeconomic level, such as shocks to the interest rates and policy changes that infringe on the bank's property rights and expropriate either fully or partially the bank's revenue and capital. Recent experience has reminded us that a systemic banking crisis can induce large costs for the economy, and therefore it is important to have advance information about bank exposures to the tail risk. However, tail risk is difficult to quantify given tail risk events are rare and past information may not be informative for the future. The risks undertaken by banks during normal time may differ significantly from tail risks, e.g., high risk taking banks may have high exposure to market in normal times but may be resilient to crisis events. Throughout the paper we use the term ''bank risk-taking'' to indicate the risk that banks are taking through operating activities. A bank needs to assume risk to make profits, but it ultimately becomes insolvent when it is exposed to too many risks of any type. To encompass the features of various risk sources as discussed above, we measure the risk using Z-score, a standard measure of risk (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston et al., 2010) . It is specified as
where ROA and E/A are return on assets and equity-to-asset ratio, calculated as the mean over 3 years (present year and the past 2 years). Further, r(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA, calculated over the same time window. Z-score can be interpreted as the number of standard deviations by which returns would have to fall from the mean to deplete all equity in the bank. Assuming that bank profits are normally distributed (Roy, 1952) , the inverse Z-score can be used to approximate a bank's probability of default (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Goetz, 2012; Jiménez et al., 2013) . Intuitively, a bank would default if its capital reserve were used up by its losses. That means when a bank has a sufficient large negative return, which makes ROA + E/A < 0, a bank will go out of business. Hence, the size of Z-score indicates the distance to default. A higher Z-score implies a lower probability of insolvency and a greater financial stability. Because Z-score is highly skewed, we follow Laeven and Levine (2009) and use the natural logarithm of the Z-score, which is normally distributed.
In addition to Z-score, we also use r(ROA), the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (NPL), and the equity-to-asset ratio (Equity Ratio) following previous literature (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston et al., 2010) . The purpose of using these risk measures is to see whether the increase (or decrease) in overall financial stability comes from a decrease in asset risk or an increase in capitalization. Given the asset booms in many transition countries, institutional reforms could reduce asset risk rather than simply increase capitalization. Moreover, we also use r(ROE) as a proxy for market-based measure as robustness check.
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It is also worth noting that Z-score is an absolute measure of financial stability. It reflects little about the relative financial stability (e.g., how close individual banks are to the most financially stable among them). Two banks may have the same Z-score, but one might optimize the risk-return tradeoff in a way that achieves more financial stability while the other engages in too many risky projects (e.g., securities) and is exposed to higher risk. The second 8 Besides volatility of ROE, we also obtain weekly equity return for banks listed in the stock market of transition countries from Datastream. We measure volatility of equity return as the annualized standard deviation of weekly equity return. We also compute idiosyncratic return volatility by regressing weekly returns of individual bank of each year on market return and industry return and then obtaining the standard deviation of residuals. These market-based risk measures complement accounting measures, but given that publicly traded banks in transition markets are very few, we only have market risk measures for 55 banks in our sample.
bank is not maximizing its financial stability but could do so if it distributed its resources among risky and less risky assets more efficiently. This example shows that some relative measures can be useful complements to the Z-score. In the banking literature, the concept of X-efficiency has been widely used to evaluate how banks perform compared with ''best-practice'' banks in terms of cost minimization or profit maximization (Leibenstein, 1966) . If stability is a risk-adjusted performance measure, we can use a similar approach to estimate the X-efficiency of stability. This relative stability measure is an alternative measure of financial stability. Appendix B illustrates the estimation procedure. Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the key variables. The observations are at the bank-year level. The average Z-score for all banks is about 46, indicating that on average, ROAs have to fall by 46 times their standard deviation to deplete bank equity. Our estimates show that only 47.5% of the best performers on the frontier achieve average financial stability. The mean (median) ROA is 0.01 (0.01) and the mean (median) r(ROA) is 0.009 (0.004). Both numbers are lower than those in developed countries and major emerging markets (Houston et al., 2010) . The mean of total assets is 1800.781 million; equity-to-asset ratio is 13.1%; NPL ratio is 4.7%; loan ratio is 52%; and deposit ratio is 76.3%. All these financial variables are comparable with those in prior studies on transition banks (e.g., Bonin et al., 2005a Bonin et al., , 2005b . We use per capita GDP (reported in $000) to control for economic development, and we use inflation (reported as a percentage) to control for economic stability. We also include deposit insurance coverage and banking crisis information. In our sample, 96.2% of the country-year observations have explicit deposit insurance and 9.4% of the observations are experiencing a banking crisis. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A.
Summary statistics
Empirical analysis
Empirical model: difference-in-difference approach (DID)
We examine the effects of institutional reforms on bank risk using a DID approach following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and . The estimation is at the individual bank level and is specified as:
where i indexes individual banks, j indexes countries, and t indexes years. The dependent variable is individual bank risk at year t. Independent variables of interest are the three types of institutional reforms. We are interested in estimating b, which captures the sensitivity of bank risk to institutional reforms. Notice that we use 1-year lag values of the reform variables considering that the reform indicators represent year-end status. The model includes a full set of time effects (a t ), country fixed effects (a j ) (we also use bank fixed effect as a robustness check in Table 3 ), a constant term (a 0 ), and various bank-specific and country macro-controls. Specifically, we control for various bank-specific characteristics including assets of year t, and Equity Ratio, Loan Ratio, Deposit Ratio, and LLP (loan loss provision ratio) of year t À 1. We also include some country-level macro-variables, including Inflation, GDP per Capita, indicator of Deposit Insurance, and indicator of Bank Crisis. We use Inflation to control macroeconomic stability and GDP per Capita to capture income levels and the economic development of a country. Deposit Insurance is used to proxy for market discipline, which influences bank stability (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Barth et al., 2006; DeLong and Saunders, 2011) . Bank Crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country is going through a systemic crisis in a given year; it equals 0 otherwise. We include it in the model to control for the negative impact of bank crises on the stability of banking sectors. The detailed definitions of these variables can be found in Appendix A.
How institutional reforms affect bank stability
In Table 3 , we run Eq. (2) using log(Z-score) as the dependent variable. The first four columns use country fixed effects, and the last four columns use firm fixed effects. For each model specification, we consistently find that all three types of institutional reforms are positively and significantly associated with Z-score. For example, as shown in column (1), a one-standard-deviation increase in Legal Reform is associated with 0.53 increase in log(Z-score) (0.53 = 1.262 ⁄ 0.4163), where the mean of log(Z-score) is 3.26. Taking sample mean to illustrate, 0.53 increase in log(Z-score) translates into about 0.3% decrease in probability of default. 9 The effect is economically important. This suggests that creditor rights empower banks to secure their loans and enforce their claims in bankruptcy procedures. Therefore, with strengthened creditor rights, banks enjoy greater financial stability. Column (2) shows that the coefficient of Banking Reform is 0.6982, which means that an improvement of banking reform indicator by one standard deviation translates to a 0.32 increase in log(Z-score) (0.32 = 0.463 ⁄ 0.6982). This translates into 0.12% decrease in probability of default (taking sample mean to apply). This finding is consistent with the argument in the literature that fewer restrictions give banks more freedom to explore economies of scope and scale and thereby create more stable revenue (e.g., Claessens and Klingebiel, 2000; Barth et al., 2001a Barth et al., , 2001b Barth et al., , 2004 Laeven and Levine, 2009) . Column (3) reports the regression results for Corporate Reform. The coefficient is 1.7057, which implies that a one-standard-deviation improvement of corporate reform indicator is associated with 0.54 increase in log(Z-score) (0.54 = 0.317 ⁄ 1.7057). This translates into 0.2% decrease in probability of default (taking sample mean to apply). Recall that the corporate reform indicator measures the progress in privatizing state-owned firms and implementing modern corporate governance. Therefore, this finding highlights the key role that these activities have in reducing risk in the financial sector. Evaluating all three types of institutional reforms simultaneously is the ideal way to see if their impacts on bank risk hold after controlling each one. One difficulty of doing so, however, is that Corporate Reform and Banking Reform are highly correlated 9 Probability of default can be approximated by inverse Z-score (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Goetz, 2012) . Here 0.53 increase in log_Zscore equals 3.39 increase in Z-score.
Taking sample mean (Z-score = 46) to illustrate, 3.39 increase in Z-score leads to 0.2% decrease in probability of default (0.2% = 1/46 À 1/(46 + 3.39)).
(with a correlation of 0.7712). To deal with this multicollinearity problem, we use a residual approach following Martin and Mauer (2005) . In particular, we regress Corporate Reform on Banking Reform and predict the residuals. The residuals, Corporate Reform (resid), capture the portion of Corporate Reform that is not explained by Banking Reform. This approach greatly reduces the correlation to 0.0000. Columns (4) in Table 3 report the estimation results of the residual approach. The results are quite robust when combining the reforms. Our results are consistent with existing literature. As might be expected, banks of larger size and with more capital enjoy higher stability. Loan loss provisions (LLP) in the previous year, which proxy for ex-ante credit risk, are negatively related to Z-score. We also account for loan ratio and deposit ratio, but they do not have significant effects on Z-score. Examining the country-level macro-controls, our results show that having an explicit deposit insurance policy significantly decreases bank stability. This is consistent with previous studies, which argue that deposit insurance diminishes market discipline and intensifies moral-hazard problems in banking (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Barth et al., 2006) .
One drawback of banking reform indicator is that it combines both bank liberalization in the early stage of the reform and prudential bank regulation in the later period. The two types of reforms may have conflicting effects on bank risk. To address this concern, we have done two additional tests to tackle the effects of prudential regulations versus banking liberalizations. First, we have added a time dummy to proxy later stage of the banking reform. The dummy variable is defined as year 2000 and after because around 2000, most of Central Eastern European countries in our sample have initiated accession negotiations with the European Union (EU) and made commitments to improve their regulatory framework and supervisory norms to catch up with Western Europe standard. We interact the time dummy with banking reform indicator. The coefficient of the interaction term captures the additional effect of banking reform on bank stability after 2000. As shown in Appendix C (Table C-1), the coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting that the positive effect of banking reform on bank stability is dominant by prudential regulation and supervision during the later stage of transition. Column (2) and Column (3) in Table C Second, we obtain bank regulation measures from World Bank database compiled by Barth et al. (2001b) and updated by Barth et al. (2006 Barth et al. ( , 2007b to examine the impact of regulatory and supervisory policies on bank stability in transition economies. The surveys were conducted in 2000, 2003, and 2007 , reflecting banks' practices regarding the three Pillars of Basel II (capital requirements, supervision by monetary authorities, and market discipline). The changes of measures over time allows us to use difference-in-difference approach to test how changes of bank regulation influences bank stability, which is consistent with our baseline model. In particular, we examine three specific bank regulations, including official supervisory power, loan classification, and external governance. ''Supervisory power'' refers to the extent to which a government agency has the power to monitor and discipline banks. Higher score of supervisory power means stronger enforcement by the supervisory authorities to take actions to prevent and correct problems related to bank lending and the functioning of banks as financial intermediaries. ''Loan classification'' refers to the classification of loans in areas as sub-standard doubtful and loss. Higher values indicate greater stringency in loan classification. ''External governance'' is a combined index of external audit, transparency of bank financial statements practices, accounting practices, and external ratings and creditor monitoring. Higher values mean better corporate governance from these aspects. The results, as reported in Table C -2, show that these three specific regulation variables lead to higher bank stability. This suggests that banking reforms that focus on prudential regulation and supervision significantly improve bank stability. Together with the first test on the time dummy variable (Table C-1), we conclude that prudential regulation plays a dominant role in the banking reforms that enhance bank stability.
Interplay between different institutional reforms
In this section, we further explore the interplay between different reforms. We hypothesize that different institutions could be dependent on each other to effectively reduce bank risk. For example, conditioning on the progress of banking reforms, the legal institutional reforms and corporate governance restructuring may have different effects on banking stability. In other words, the effects of banking reforms on bank risk could be more direct than other reforms, such that countries with poor banking reforms might be unable to sustain a stable banking sector even though legal-and corporate governance reforms are well developed. It is also possible that legal-or corporate reforms are more important than banking reforms. When countries suffer from poorly functioning legal systems or corporate governance, banking reforms alone might not be sufficient to improve banking stability.
We test above hypotheses and report results in Table 4 . The dependent variable is logarithm of Z-score. In Column 1 and 2, we divide our sample into two groups based on the median value of banking reform indicator, and look at how the other two reforms affect bank risk depending on the level of banking reforms. The estimation follows DID approach. Results show that both legaland corporate reforms increase bank stability significantly, but only in countries with high banking reforms. These findings suggest that for legal-and corporate reforms to effectively improve bank stability, a well-liberalized banking sector is a prerequisite. In Column 3 and 4, we analyze the effects of banking reforms and legal reforms on countries with low versus high level of corporate reforms. As the results show, both reforms could exert a significant and positive impact on bank stability irrespective of different levels of corporate reforms. In the last two columns, we look at subsamples of high-versus low legal reform countries, finding that corporate reforms could reduce bank risk more significantly when the legal reforms are more developed. The effect of banking reforms, however, does not depend on the development of legal reforms. Overall, our results in Table 4 imply that banking reforms are relatively the most important among the three for bank stability. The effects of legal reforms and corporate reforms on bank risk may critically depend on the progress of banking reforms. After a relatively more liberalized banking sector is established, stronger legal institution and corporate governance structure could contribute more to the enhancement of banking stability.
Simultaneous estimations of bank risk, foreign presence, and profitability
We are concerned about two channels through which institutional reforms could affect bank risk indirectly. The first channel is the large presence of foreign banks in the transition market. As institutional environment improves, more foreign banks would come in the market (e.g., Buch, 2003) . Compared with domestic banks in developing countries, many foreign banks have superior risk-management techniques and enjoy higher financial stability than domestic banks. Hence, it is very possible that a large presence of foreign banks in transition market is driving our results. Another channel is that banks might achieve greater stability through avoiding taking risky but value-enhancing projects. Looking at ROA of banks could provide a complete picture on bank risk.
If banks sacrifice profitability to achieve lower risk, then this is not good for shareholders and it certainly weakens the significance of our prior findings. We employ a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to correct for the potential correlations among bank risk, foreign presence, and bank profitability (Zellner, 1962; Acharya et al., 2006) . Specifically, we use log(Z-score) to measure bank risk, the number of foreign banks (to proxy for foreign bank presence), and ROA (to proxy for their profitability). Three dependent variables are regressed on the same set of variables specified in Eq. (2). Bank fixed effect and year fixed effect are included.
As shown in Table 5 , after simultaneously controlling for profitability and foreign bank presence, bank stability still increases subsequent to the legal reforms and banking liberalization. However, the positive effect of enterprise reform on bank stability is not as pronounced. We do find evidence that the number of foreign banks increases subsequent to institutional reforms. However, corporate reforms and banking reforms do not affect profitability. Profitability actually increases after legal reforms. Hence, our concern on the risk-return trade-off is not needed.
Further test: foreign versus domestic banks
We have shown that banks generally become more financially stable after institutional reforms occur. In this subsection, we further examine whether domestic banks and foreign banks benefit in different ways. Because foreign banks tend to perform better and have superior risk-management skills than domestic banks (e.g., Claessens et al., 2001) , it is possible that foreign banks drive these increases in financial stability. Moreover, better institutional environments could reduce information asymmetry and promote investor-friendly and efficient markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Buch, 2003) , which also implies that the reduction of bank risk might be larger for foreign banks.
On the other hand, domestic banks are inefficient to start with, and therefore there is higher scope for improvement. Moreover, foreign banks may also be less sensitive to the institutional conditions in host countries but more sensitive to the wishes of parent banks at home (De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006; Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2011) . A recent paper by Ongena et al. (2013) also suggests that foreign banks' lending standard is associated with the strictness of home country regulation rather than foreign country. Hence, the impact of institutional reforms can have less significant impact on foreign banks operating in that country. Additionally, as indicated by prior studies, foreign banks tend to lend more to firms in better legal environments (Qian and Strahan, 2007; . This could imply that the improved institutional environment may incentivize foreign banks to take on riskier projects, which then would lower the loan recovery rates and raise insolvency risk. Overall, these arguments lead to a competing hypothesis that the reduction of bank risk might be larger for domestic banks. To test these above hypotheses, we divide our sample into domestic banks and foreign banks and estimate Eq. (2) for each sample separately. Table 6 reports our results. Using the DID approach, we find that domestic banks' financial stability improves subsequent to all three types of institutional reforms, but foreign banks' financial stability improves only after legal reform occurs. We believe that these findings for foreign banks reflect the neutralization of two effects. That is, strengthened institutional environments could reduce information barriers foreign banks face and therefore reduce their risk, but strengthened institutional environments could also enhance investors' confidence and induce them to take risky projects, especially for foreign investors who are not familiar with local environment. That is why the effects of institutional reforms on bank risk are less pronounced for foreign banks than domestic banks.
Our findings may also suggest that foreign banks rely on their parents and therefore are less sensitive to macroeconomic conditions in host countries. Consistent with this argument, a further separation of foreign banks into foreign takeover and foreign greenfield subcategories reveals that foreign takeover banks improve their financial stability significantly after legal reforms, but greenfields do not. Because greenfields are usually subsidiaries of large multinational banks, they are more dependent on their parents than takeover banks are. Therefore, the institutional reforms in their host countries do not influence their financial stability.
Alternative measures of bank risk
While previous analysis use on Z-score as the measure of bank risk, Table 7 reports the results using alternative risk measures. As shown in Table 7 , we use r(ROA) and the nonperforming loan ratio (NPL) as two proxies for asset risk. Results in Column (1) shows that all three types of institutional reforms significantly reduce banks' ROA volatility. Nonperforming loans, as shown in Column (2), also fall after banking reforms and corporate reforms occur. These findings strong evidence that improving the institutional environment leads to lower asset risk. Next we examine whether improving institutional reforms affect bank equity capital, as the increase of overall financial stability could be driven by increase of capital ratio. Interestingly, as shown in Column (3), we do not find any increase of equity after any type of reforms. Rather, banks reduce capitalization after the banking system is liberalized. These findings suggest that the improvement of overall financial stability is not driven by capital ratio, but the reduction of asset risk. In Column (4), we use r(ROE) as a proxy for market risk, and find that corporate reforms and banking reforms significantly reduce bank risk in terms of volatility of equity returns. 10 In Column (5), we examine how institutional reforms affect the relative stability of individual banks. The Relative Stability measures how well individual banks could formulate production plans and attain their highest potential stability. As explained in Appendix B, even though two banks may have the same Z-score, one may be at optimal stability while the other is not, and the difference may come from exogenous elements such as managerial inefficiency or environment. Because the aim of this paper is to investigate bank stability as it relates to changes in the operating environment, we acknowledge that relative stability may also reflect managerial efficiency. However, we try to mitigate this problem by controlling various bank-specific variables and using fixed effects. As shown in the results, the coefficients of the institutional reforms on relative stability are positive and significant, which confirm our argument that institutional reforms exert positive impacts on bank stability.
Conclusion
A significant body of literature on law and finance is based on market economies, where institutional development began hundreds of years ago and the quality of the institutions has barely changed over the last several decades. Largely absent from this literature, however, is an examination of how institutional changes affect the risk-taking behavior of banks in transition economies. Transition economies arguably need more research guidance due to their relatively recent moves away from socialist pasts and there is a lack of knowledge about how such institutional changes can be transmitted to banking stability. The present paper furthers the scholarship in this area.
Our findings have several policy implications. A rich literature has emphasized the importance of institutional development as a key factor determining financial market development. However, the causal relationship has not been successfully explored due to the stickiness of institutional variables and their correlation with other country-level economic factors. This study exploits the exogenous variations of institutional development in transition economies, and demonstrates its causal effects on banking stability. Specifically, our findings show that after countries liberalize The main interested independent variables are the three institutional reforms. Control variables include various bank characteristics and country macro-factors. All estimations include year fixed effect and use robust standard errors. T-statistics are presented in brackets. * Significance level at 10% level. ** Significance level at 5% level. *** Significance level at 1% level. 10 In the unreported results, we also find that all three types of institutional reforms are significantly and negatively associated with volatility of stock returns and idiosyncratic stock returns. However, these findings are based on OLS regressions rather than difference-in-difference estimations because of the limited sample size.
interest rates, decentralize central banks' roles, and deregulate bank activities, individual banks experience an improvement in financial stability. Legal reforms in corporate governance and creditor rights also exert positive impacts on banking stability. The findings on the causal relationships point to a channel through which policy changes can have a positive impact on banking stability. Specifically, for transition countries, policies that promote banking liberalization, strengthen creditor rights, and facilitate better corporate governance are likely to promote a higher degree of banking stability. Moreover, our findings also show a complementary effect between legal institutional reforms and banking reforms. Specifically, different institutions could be dependent on one other to effectively reduce risk taking by banks. In countries with better-implemented banking reforms, the creditor rights reforms and corporate governance reforms improve banking stability more significantly. However, the effect of banking reforms on bank risk does not rely on the development of other reforms. These findings suggest that the effects of banking reforms on bank risk are more direct than other reforms. Countries with poor banking reforms are unable to sustain a stable banking sector even though legal and corporate governance reforms might be well developed.
Finally, by examining the impacts of institutional reforms on foreign versus domestic banks, our study provides related implications for international banking regulation. Recent studies have suggested that multinational banks tend to take advantage of the cross-country differences in regulations to lend more and lend with lower standard to countries where banking regulation is less strict (Houston et al., 2012; Ongena et al., 2013) . These findings point to a possibility that there could be more risk taking activities for multinational banks when they enter a less restrictively regulated banking market. Our findings provide first and direct evidence that in transition countries when the market is liberalized and legal environment improves foreign banks' risk taking is not significantly reduced in comparison to domestic banks. While economists have long argued that a better institutional environment attracts more foreign investments, our findings suggest that domestic banks enjoy greater improvement in financial stability than foreign banks. We employ a stochastic frontier approach (SFA) to fit an upper envelope of financial stability, proxied by Z-score. The difference between the envelope value and actual Z-score represents a bank's deviation from its potential highest stability, thereby providing information on banks' relative stability.
One difficulty here is to find a functional form for Z-score. We consider Z-score as a risk-adjusted profit, and hence use the nonstandard profit function 11 to fit the Z-score frontier. The model is s m ln z lnðw m =w 3 Þ þ year dummies þ GDP growth þ inflation þ ln l þ ln t where y represents two variables (y 1 = total loans and y 2 = other earning assets), w represents three input prices (w 1 = price of borrowed funds, w 2 = fixed capital, and w 3 = price of labor), and z is equity capital. The normalization by the last input price (w 3 ) ensures price homogeneity. In the estimation, we include year dummies to control for year fixed effect and country macroeconomic variables to reduce heterogeneity. The term lnm is a random noise variable and lnl represents the inefficiency of formulating a production plan to obtain the optimal financial stability. The advantage of SFA approach is that it can disentangle the inefficiency component (lnl) from the random noise with certain distribution assumption (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977) . Here we assume the inefficiency component follows halfnormal distribution because no banks operate beyond the optimal stability.
Appendix C
See Tables C-1 and C-2. 
